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Summary 
 
The recent events that followed the US decision not to comply with the Kyoto Protocol 
seem to drastically undermine the effectiveness of the Protocol in controlling GHG 
emissions. Therefore, it is important to explore whether there are economic factors and 
policy strategies that might help the US to modify its current policy and move back to 
the Kyoto-Bonn agreement. For example, can an increased participation of developing 
countries induce the US to effectively participate in the effort to reduce GHG 
emissions? Is a single emission trading market the appropriate policy framework to 
increase participation in the Kyoto-Bonn agreement? This paper addresses the above 
questions by analysing whether the participation of China in the cooperative effort to 
control GHG emissions can provide adequate incentives for the US to move back to the 
Kyoto process and eventually ratify the Kyoto Protocol. This paper analyses three 
different climate regimes in which China could be involved and assesses the 
participation incentives for the major world countries and regions in these three 
regimes. 
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China and the Evolution of the Present Climate Regime 
 
1.  Introduction  
In March 2001, the President of the United States, George W. Bush, announced that the US would not 
comply with the Kyoto Protocol in its present form.  Following this decision, some countries reacted 
by strengthening their commitment to continue the Kyoto process, whereas other countries decided to 
fall in line with the US strategy (Cf. Section 2 below). In particular, Russia has adopted an ambiguous 
position, thus raising a lot of uncertainty as to whether and when the Kyoto Protocol will come 
effectively into force. What economic forces have led to what seems to be a major drawback in the 
international effort to combat climate change? 
 
According to a recent strand of economic literature (Cf. Buchner, Carraro and Cersosimo, 2002 for a 
survey), the main economic consequences of the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol can be 
summarised as follows: 
 
♦  The US withdrawal and the new provisions included in the Marrakech agreement imply a strong 
decline in the environmental effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol.  
♦  The US defection induces a decreasing demand for emission permits and consequently a decline in 
the permit price, thus reducing the incentives to abate emissions and invest in climate friendly 
technologies in all countries.
1 
♦  The smaller permit price after the US defection reduces the permit suppliers’ benefits from 
participating in the Kyoto agreement. This provides additional incentives for Russia to use its 
increased bargaining power in climate negotiations.
2 
 
                                                       
1 Some studies highlight feedback effects that can mitigate the fall in the permit price. Strategic market 
behaviours can indeed modify the size of the expected changes in prices and abatement costs. In particular, these 
changes are much smaller than initially suggested. For example, banking and monopolistic behaviour in the 
permit market (Manne and Richels, 2001; Den Elzen and de Moor, 2001; Böhringer and Löschel, 2001) or 
strategic R&D behaviour (Buchner, Carraro and Cersosimo, 2002) can offset the demand shift and reduce the 
decline of the permit price consequent to the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol.  
2 A condition for the Kyoto Protocol to come into force is that at least 55 Parties to the Convention, representing 
at the same time at least 55% of 1990 carbon dioxide emissions of Annex B Parties, must have ratified the treaty. 
After the US withdrew from the Protocol, the participation of some countries, in particular of Russia, has thus 
become crucial. The outcome of COP 7 in Marrakech includes considerable concessions to Russia and thereby 
confirms Russia’s increased bargaining power. In addition, at the Climate Conference in Moscow in September 
2003, President Putin backed away from Russia’s earlier pledge to swiftly ratify the treaty, stating that a decision 
on Kyoto will only be taken when the work on clarifying and analysing the issues related to the complex 
problem of climate change has been concluded. (Reuters, Sept. 29
th, 2003). The fact that there is no provision  
for timetables provides additional evidence of Russia’s  strategic behaviour  designed to exploit its increased 
bargaining power.  
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The US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol is thus responsible for a number of serious environmental 
and economic problems, ranging from the deterioration of the environmental effectiveness of the 
Protocol to the increase in Russia’s bargaining power.  
 
Accordingly, several doubts have emerged on the appropriateness and sense of pursuing the Kyoto 
Protocol in its actual form. In particular, the low environmental impact of this policy framework has 
induced new debates about the need to increase the number of participating countries. On the one 
hand, the need to involve the US again in international efforts to combat climate change is 
emphasised, while on the other hand the role and future participation of developing countries has 
assumed greater importance. 
 
Therefore, one of the goals of this paper is to analyse how climate negotiations may evolve after the 
Marrakech, Delhi and Milan Conferences of the Parties. The crucial question is what participation 
incentives are provided by the present constellation of Kyoto countries, and consequently what the 
future participation decisions of some key players might be. The most important of these key players 
is certainly the US. It is widely recognised that US participation would strongly increase the 
environmental effectiveness of the Kyoto/Bonn agreement. Therefore, this paper addresses the 
following questions: Are there incentives for the US to move back to the Kyoto Protocol, i.e. do the 
US benefits from joining the current climate regime? What kind of climate regime could provide 
adequate incentives for the US to join a climate coalition? In order to reduce abatement costs, do the 
US finds it profitable to sign a bilateral deal with a low abatement cost country?  
 
Some of these questions have been explored in other recent papers. For example, in Buchner, Carraro, 
Cersosimo and Marchiori (2002) the effectiveness of a strategy that links climate and R&D 
cooperation is assessed, whereas Buchner and Carraro (2003a) analyse whether a climate regime 
entirely based on technological cooperation, without binding emission targets, could be supported by 
the US. In both papers, the main goal is to identify policy strategies that increase US participation 
incentives. 
 
This paper also addresses the above questions, but from a different viewpoint. Here the goal is to  
ascertain whether China, by ratifying the Kyoto Protocol and eventually participating in an 
international emissions trading market, can provide the US with adequate incentives to join a climate 
coalition and to achieve  the emission targets defined in Kyoto. In Section 2, this paper analyses the 
evolution which led to the current climate regime, by identifying the economic and political forces that 
are responsible for the present situation. Then, in Section 3, some game theory results on the 
incentives that China’s participation in a climate agreement provides for the US to modify its decision 
not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol are discussed. The presence of China in a climate coalition could  
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indeed reduce GHG abatement costs in a way that could make the Kyoto Protocol the most 
economically attractive climate strategy for the US. Therefore, this paper shows costs and benefits of 
China’s decision to cooperate with the Annex B-US countries (all Annex B countries less the US and 
Australia) in controlling GHG emissions. In addition, the paper provides a quantitative game theory  
analysis of US participation incentives, both in the case of a single coalition in which the Annex B-US 
countries, China and the US participate, and in the case of a bilateral deal between China and the US 
(a two country coalition) which could be complementary to the Kyoto coalition. A final section 
summarises our conclusions. 
 
 
2.  Policy evolution after the Marrakech negotiations. A short overview 
 
The political deal reached in Marrakech at the Seventh Conference of Parties (COP-7) has legally 
confirmed the existence of a “tri-polar climate change regime” (Egenhofer and Legge, 2001), where 
the first group of cooperating countries consists of the industrialised countries less the US and 
Australia, the second one consists of the developing countries, while the last one is formed by the 
United States of America and Australia. 
 
Within the other two major groups, some sub-groups can be identified. In particular, the group of 
industrialised countries can be divided into: (i) the European Union, including “its near abroad”; (ii) 
Russia; and (iii) the Umbrella Group, which after COP-7 still included Japan, Canada and New 
Zealand. After the US defection and given the EU commitment to the Kyoto Protocol, the Umbrella 
group countries and Russia achieved notable bargaining power in climate negotiations. As a 
consequence of the increased stringency of the 55% provision of Art. 25 of the Kyoto Protocol – and 
after the ratification of the EU, Japan and Canada – Russia has become the key player. Moreover, 
Russia also plays a special role in the prospective permit market, because of the amount of emission 
allowances (“hot air”) that Russia possesses, at least in the first commitment period.  
 
Another group of countries includes the developing countries, which are not bound by any emission 
reduction targets in the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, being however already 
involved in mitigation activities through various obligations, e.g., reporting requirements. 
Nevertheless, since they are going to represent the largest future CO2 producers, their participation in a 
climate agreement is necessary – at least in the medium term  – for emission reductions to attain a 
level consistent with the stabilisation of GHG concentration below 600ppmv. In addition, this  
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involvement is also needed in order to create the pre-conditions to induce some countries, e.g. the US, 
to re-join the international climate change control coalition
3.  
 
In the light of  this complex situation, what happened after the Marrakech Conference of the Parties? 
One month after COP-7, in December 2001, the EU had already made some progress by compiling a 
“Draft Proposal for a Council Decision concerning the approval, on behalf of the European 
Community, of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
and the joint fulfilment of commitments thereunder” (EC, 2001). The European Union announced the 
ratification of the treaty on May 31
st, 2002. Moreover, within the context of COP-8 in New Delhi, the 
EU clearly stated that Kyoto must be considered as “the only show in town”, urging other countries to 
participate and criticising again the US for their refusal to ratify Kyoto (The Hindu, Oct. 24
th, 2002). 
 
In Japan, the decision process towards the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol met with a number of 
contradictory signals. In January 2002, The Japan Times reported that Japan was planning  to ratify the 
Kyoto Protocol early in 2002 (The Japan Times, Jan. 21
st, 2002)
4. Despite these early promising signs, 
the ratification was postponed several times due to internal problems, first to March 2002 and then to 
late Spring 2002. Widely divergent views held by two government ministries over climate change 
control strategies – in particular over domestic measures to be taken to meet the emission targets – and 
uncertainties over the plans of other key players, e.g. Canada and Australia, were main reasons behind 
Japan’s delayed ratification.
5 Furthermore, although Japan did manage to achieve a number of 
concessions in Marrakech, business groups still were reluctant to support the Kyoto Protocol. They 
feared that the commitment to the Kyoto emission reduction targets could lead to a competitive 
disadvantage with respect to the US
6. However, despite these controversies, the Japanese Cabinet 
approved the Kyoto Protocol on June 4
th, 2002.
7 
                                                       
3 The lack of participation by developing countries  has been one of the main US criticisms of the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
4 Even if the ratification  was postponed, on February 1
st 2002 the government announced an anti-global 
warming bill in line with the Kyoto Protocol which would be implemented soon (Kyodo News, Feb. 1
st, 2002). 
5 For more detailed information see for example CO2e.com, Feb.13
th, 2002; Asahi Shimbun, Feb. 11
th, 2002; 
Christian Science Monitor, March 12
th, 2002; Japan Today News, Feb. 26
th, 2002 and Kyodo News, Feb. 21
st, 
2002.  
6 For more detailed information see for example BBC, Jan, 3
rd, 2002; CO2e.com, Jan. 8
th, 2002; The Japan 
Times, Jan. 17
th, 2002; The Japan Times, Jan. 18
th, 2002.  
7 Due to the strong links with the US economy, Japan is still particularly worried about the US plans on climate 
change control and there are signs that Japan plans to enhance its cooperation with the US on climate change 
control. Even before ratifying the Kyoto Protocol, Japan started preliminary talks with the US aimed at 
discussing how Japan and the US might cooperate to reduce GHG emissions (The Japan Times, Feb. 27
th, 2002; 
Japan Today News, Feb. 27
th, 2002). In early April 2002, government officials from Japan and the US agreed on 
15 steps to prevent global warming (CO2e.com, April 5
th, 2002). Although Japan finally decided to ratify the 
Kyoto Protocol, its parallel initiatives with the US and its efforts to convince other countries of the advantages 
and necessity to participate in the Kyoto agreement demonstrate that Japan is still  dubious and concerned about   
  6
 
Russia has also had (and still has) some difficulties in deciding on a clear position with regard to  the 
Kyoto Protocol after the US withdrawal. The increase in its bargaining power has motivated Russia to 
further exploit its strong negotiating position. As the outcome of COP-7 demonstrated, the need to 
induce Russia to participate in the agreement translated into various concessions to Russia, e.g. less 
stringent targets or increased flexibility (e.g. increased sinks allowances). As a consequence, in March 
2002, the Russian Energy Minister Igor Yusufov announced that Russia intends to ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol soon (RBC network, March 11
th, 2002). However, some weeks after this announcement, 
Russia emphasised that its ratification was far from guaranteed and would depend strongly on both the 
EU and Japan’s future strategies. Russian government officials said that Russia may delay ratification 
of the Kyoto Protocol until these countries give their official consent to buy carbon dioxide emission 
credits from Russia (Financial Times, March 22
nd, 2002; Yomiuri Shimbun, March 28
th, 2002). In 
addition, at a high level ministerial meeting in New Delhi during COP-8, Russia called upon all 
developed countries to comply, in particular those who are members of the UNFCCC, and also called 
on the need for the active future participation of the developing countries (The Hindu, Oct. 31
st, 2002). 
 
Although never seriously threatening to formally defect, Russia clearly exploits its high bargaining 
power and continues to send contradictory signals with respect to its position on the Kyoto treaty. In 
particular, the recent Climate Change Conference, held in Moscow from September 29
th to October 
3
rd, 2003, was tempered by announcements indicating that the Kyoto Protocol is unlikely to come into 
force in the near future. President Putin’s opening address explained that Russia’s position had 
considerably changed during the last year. Putin said that Russia has not made a decision on whether 
to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and will not do so until it had finished studying the implications that 
ratification would have for the country, looking also at the benefits that could arise from global 
warming to a northern country like Russia: "The government is thoroughly considering and studying 
the entire complex of difficult problems linked with it. A decision will be made only after this work 
has been completed and it will be made in accordance with the national interest of the Russian 
Federation." (RFE/RL, Sept. 29
th, 2003). The insistence that more research is needed seems to 
represent a further piece of Russia’s strategic bargaining strategy, rather than indicating that it does not 
intend to ratify the Kyoto Protocol at all
8. The debate on Kyoto is still ongoing in Russia, as recent 
official announcements that Kyoto will be ratified in 2004 clearly indicate (Dow Jones Newswires, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
the present climate regime. See for example Japan Today News, Jan. 19
th, 2002 and Japan Today News, Feb. 
27
th, 2002; Japan Today News, June 4
th, 2002. 
8 As already indicated above, the link between Russian emission credits and the European emission trading 
system appears to play a key role vis-à-vis  Russia’s  official position.  
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Oct. 28
th, 2003), This is also because Russia’s industry and NGOs both seem to be in favour of  
ratification
9.  
 
An important step forward in the Kyoto process was achieved at the UN World Summit on Sustainable 
Development (WSSD) held in Johannesburg from August 26
th to September 4
th, 2002
10,  where China 
announced it would ratify the Kyoto Protocol. Already in January 2002, China had expressed its 
favourable views on the Kyoto Protocol and surprised the world by calling it a “win-win deal for 
industrialised and poorer countries alike” and by pushing for an earliest possible enforcement of the 
treaty (Planet Ark, Jan. 18
th, 2002). This statement showed that China was getting serious not only 
about domestic environmental protection, but also about international cooperation to control climate 
change. China confirmed its willingness to participate in the Kyoto framework by approving the treaty 
on August 30
th, 2002. Despite the lack of a reduction target for greenhouse gas emissions
11, Beijing's 
decision to ratify the Kyoto Protocol is generally considered as an important boost to the domestic and 
international fight against global warming (ABC Online, Sept. 3
rd, 2002).  
 
After China, on September 2
nd, 2002, Canada’s Prime Minister Jean Chrétien announced in 
Johannesburg that the Canadian Parliament  would be asked to ratify the Kyoto Protocol by the end of 
2002 (The Globe and Mail, Sept. 2
nd, 2002). Notwithstanding some strong criticisms on the Prime 
Minister’s strategy by Canadian provincial governments (see, e.g., Toronto Star, Sept. 4
th, 2002), 
Canada ratified the Kyoto Protocol on December 17
th, 2002 (Toronto Star, Dec. 17
th, 2002). 
 
During all the aforementioned discussions, the two main countries that refused to ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol, the US and Australia, have been both nationally and internationally strongly criticised for 
“taking positions solely on the basis of national interests” (The Age, August 30
th, 2002). Subsequently, 
the US President George Bush was urged by a delegation of US congressmen to ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol, while the Australian Prime Minister John Howard softened his initial stance on Kyoto (ABC 
News, Sept. 4
th, 2002). Nonetheless, Australian Federal Environment Minister David Kemp then 
defended his country's refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol (Sky News, Sept. 4
th, 2002). Both the US 
and Australia have justified their opposition to Kyoto by pointing at the lack of participation by the 
large developing countries above all. 
                                                       
9 In particular Russian industries see the potential benefits arising from joint projects where European countries 
invest in the introduction of cleaner technologies in Russian plants (see e.g. The International Herald Tribune, 
Oct. 28
th, 2003). 
10 For an overview on the key outcomes of the Johannesburg Summit see e.g., United Nations (2002). 
11 China has said it is open to exploring cooperation opportunities  under the Kyoto agreement, in the short run 
and primarily with respect to financial and technical aid deals. Chinese officials emphasise that the government 
will voluntarily try to restrict the growth of CO2 emissions, but is strictly opposing binding GHG reduction 
targets (The Japan Times, Jan. 26
th, 2002).  
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The above overview of the recent process towards the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol seems to 
provide little indication that the Protocol will come into force soon.
12 The September 2003 Conference 
on Climate Change held in Moscow added additional doubts on the timetabling of the ratification. 
Still, recent Russian announcements raise expectations for the Protocol’s ratification towards the end 
of 2004 (bearing in mind that Russia is likely to wait for the US elections in autumn 2004), thus 
confirming that the number of signatory countries necessary for the Kyoto Protocol to come into force 
may be achieved (Dow Jones Newswires, Oct. 28
th, 2003). 
 
However, even if it eventually comes in to force, the environmental effectiveness of the Kyoto 
Protocol without the US is very low. The US, the world’s largest producer of GHG emissions, not only 
remains outside the Kyoto framework, but has also announced a weak alternative climate change 
policy. Therefore, total GHG emissions are unlikely to be reduced, at least in the first commitment 
period. As a consequence, three issues need to be explored: (i) What are the incentives for the US to 
re-join the Kyoto coalition or to form another parallel coalition cooperating on GHG emission 
reduction? (ii) What strategy can Japan, Russia and the EU try to implement in order to induce the US 
to ratify the Kyoto Protocol? (iii) Can climate cooperation better be achieved outside the Kyoto 
framework ? 
 
This paper addresses the first question, by looking at the incentives for the US to participate in future 
climate regimes. The second question is partly answered in Buchner, Carraro, Cersosimo and 
Marchiori (2002), whereas the third question is addressed in Buchner and Carraro (2003a, 2003b). In 
particular, the analysis presented in the next sections will be centred on the role of China and on the 
new incentives that China’s participation in an international permit market may provide to the other 
countries.  
 
 
3.  An empirical assessment of the role played by China in possible future climate 
regimes 
 
The first climate regime that we plan to analyse using the FEEM-RICE model (Cf. the Appendix) is 
the one in which the European Union, Japan, the Former Soviet Union (the so called Annex B-US 
                                                       
12 As it stands now, 119 countries have ratified the Kyoto Protocol. The 119 countries account for 44.2 percent of 
carbon dioxide emissions, and Russia's 17.4 percent would push the tally over the 55 percent requirement.  
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countries) and China cooperate to reduce GHG emissions.
13 This is not to claim that a climate regime 
with Annex B-US countries and China is the most likely scenario. We simply aim to quantify the 
benefits that China’s participation in a cooperative effort to control GHG emissions could provide to 
the Annex B-US countries. Therefore, as a first step, we analyse gains and losses that would result from  
the formation of a climate coalition formed by the European Union, Japan, Russia and China. To 
achieve this goal, we quantify changes in welfare, emissions, abatement costs and R&D investments 
induced by the formation of this coalition. These changes are computed with respect to the values of 
the above variables in the present Annex B-US regime, namely a coalition formed by the EU, FSU and 
Japan, which we thus consider as our benchmark, or business-as-usual scenario. In this benchmark 
scenario, the EU, FSU and Japan meet their Kyoto targets in the first commitment period and beyond 
(see below), whereas the other countries set their abatement levels unilaterally.
14 
 
As stated above, our main goal is to assess whether the presence of China in the coalition provides 
sufficient incentives for the US to comply with the Kyoto Protocol. In particular, we analyse whether 
China’s adoption of quantitative emission limits provides new incentives for the US to cooperate 
within the Kyoto cap-and-trade framework. After China’s decision, GHG abatement costs may indeed 
become much lower and may therefore make the Kyoto Protocol the economically most attractive 
climate strategy, even for the US. 
 
To address the above issue, we need to consider a second scenario in which a coalition formed by the 
US, EU, FSU, Japan and China adopts policies to reduce GHG emissions. Again, changes of welfare, 
emissions, abatement costs and R&D investments induced by the formation of this coalition are going 
to be quantified using the FEEM-RICE model. This makes it possible to compare the net benefits of a 
large coalition in which the US participates, with the net benefits gained if the US is out, but China is 
in. However, the US may decide to participate in the international effort to control GHG emissions not 
by joining the Annex B-US coalition, but by forming another parallel coalition with China. Therefore, 
we will compute the economic consequences of this third scenario and compare its strengths and 
weaknesses with those of the other two scenarios. 
 
As shown in the Appendix, the FEEM-RICE model is a version of Nordhaus’ RICE model in which 
endogenous and induced technical change are represented. In this version, technical change plays a 
twofold role: on the one hand, via increasing returns to scale, it yields endogenous growth; on the 
                                                       
13 Given the geographical disaggregation of the FEEM-RICE model, it is not possible to account for the presence 
of Canada in the coalition. Moreover, Russia cannot be distinguished from the other countries of the Former 
Soviet Union. 
14 Therefore, in our BAU, the US and other countries that do not comply with the Kyoto Protocol may reduce 
emissions, although in a non cooperative manner.    
  10
other hand, by affecting the emission/output ratio, it accounts for the adoption of cleaner and energy-
saving technologies.
15 In addition, international technological spillovers are accounted for. 
 
In the FEEM-RICE model, six countries/regions (US, EU, Japan (JPN), former Soviet Union (FSU), 
China (CHN) and rest of the world (ROW)) optimally set the intertemporal values of four strategic 
variables: investments, R&D expenditure, abatement effort and net demand for emission permits
16. 
When no coalition forms, each country/region maximises its own individual welfare given the other 
countries’ strategy. When coalitions form, countries belonging to the same coalition maximise their 
joint welfare. Given the interdependency of countries’ decisions, the equilibrium values of the policy 
variables are obtained by solving a dynamic open-loop Nash game between the six countries/regions. 
 
Three important assumptions qualify our results. First, it is assumed that all countries/regions which 
adhere to the Kyoto/Bonn agreement  meet the Kyoto constraints from 2010 onward.
17 We therefore 
adopt the so-called “Kyoto forever” hypothesis (see, for example, Manne and Richels, 1999 and many 
others). As a consequence, our reference to the Kyoto/Bonn agreement is partly imprecise because, for 
the sake of brevity, we will sometimes call “Kyoto Protocol” or “Kyoto/Bonn agreement” a “Kyoto 
forever” scenario. In another paper (Buchner and Carraro, 2003c) we test the robustness of the results 
with respect to changes in the assumption about future commitments. 
 
Second, it is assumed that all countries  adopt cost-effective environmental policies. In particular, cost-
effective market mechanisms (e.g. emission trading) are chosen over “command-and-control” 
measures in order to guarantee the  efficient implementation of environmental targets. Please note that 
our analysis focuses only on CO2. There are other man-made greenhouse gases and the Kyoto 
Protocol takes some of them into account. Moreover, both the Bonn agreement and the subsequent 
Marrakech deal emphasise the role of sinks in meeting the Kyoto targets. However, in the FEEM-
RICE model only CO2 emissions are accounted for. 
 
                                                       
15 The FEEM-RICE model has already been used in Buonanno, Carraro, Castelnuovo and Galeotti (2001), 
Buonanno, Carraro and Galeotti (2002), Buchner, Carraro and Cersosimo (2002) and in Buchner, Carraro, 
Cersosimo and Marchiori (2002). A brief description is contained in the Appendix.  
16 Notice that, in all climate regimes, abatement is a strategic variable, which is optimally set at its welfare 
maximising level by countries both inside and outside the coalition. Coalition members adopting  the emission 
targets decided in Kyoto  may decide to reduce emissions below the target. 
17 The use of the “Kyoto forever” hypothesis is a strong assumption. However, the CO2 concentration levels 
implicit in this assumption (if RICE is a good description of the world) coincide with those in the A1B scenario 
(IPCC, 2001) which can be considered the “median” scenario among those currently proposed. We thus use the 
“Kyoto-forever” hypothesis not because it represents a realistic scenario, but as a benchmark with respect to 
which policy alternatives can be compared.  
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Third, when China belongs to a climate coalition, it is assumed that it adopts quantitative emission 
limits. However, China’s emission targets over time are assumed to coincide with its business-as-usual 
emission levels, which take into account unilateral emission reductions that may be decided by 
China.
18 This implies that when China enters a coalition and decides to cooperate on GHG emission 
abatement, it becomes a net supplier of permits.  
 
Our analysis focuses on changes in the main economic variables (welfare, as measured by discounted 
future consumption levels, R&D expenditure, global CO2 emissions and abatement costs, for which an 
indicator is the equilibrium price in the permit market
20) with respect to the business-as-usual scenario 
in which the Annex B-US coalition forms. Results shown below must be interpreted as an application of 
a game-theory model designed to identify incentive mechanisms and the economic factors behind 
them, rather than to provide realistic figures on the outcomes of future policy scenarios. 
 
 
3.1  A single coalition with the EU, Russia, Japan and China 
 
Let us start by examining the economic consequences of the formation of a climate coalition in which 
four countries/regions – EU, FSU, JPN and CHN – cooperate to reduce GHG emissions. An emission 
trading market is implemented and all cooperating countries are allowed to trade in this market 
without restrictions.
21 The coalition formed by the EU, FSU, Japan and China plays a dynamic open 
loop Nash game with the other world regions. The equilibrium of the game determines the values of 
welfare changes that will be used to assess a country’s incentive to participate in a given coalition. 
 
Figure 1 shows the impacts on welfare, emissions and R&D investments of the climate coalition 
formed by the EU, FSU, Japan and China. When these countries cooperate to reduce GHG emissions, 
the permit price is obviously lower than in the case of the Annex B-US coalition. The estimated change 
of the permit price is -78.6%. The reason for this massive decline of the permit price is China’s 
participation in the permit market, which implies an increase in the supply of emission permits. The 
large boost to the supply side of the emission market is taken to be an expected result since, under our 
                                                       
18 This scenario is often assumed in the literature on climate policy (see for example Criqui and Philibert, 2003). 
20 As we have said, a permit market is assumed to be implemented by all coalitions and even by singletons 
(domestically). Therefore, in our competitive setting, the price of permits is equivalent to an emission tax.  
21 This assumption is not consistent with the Kyoto Protocol, in which China is allowed to participate only in 
CDM projects. However, our analysis is a counterfactual analysis, designed to assess what would happen if 
China could be involved in the emission permit market.  
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assumptions on future commitments, China can sell permits whenever its emissions are below the 
business-as-usual levels.
22 
 
Thanks to this reduction in the permit price, the EU and Japan can achieve their own emission targets  
at a lower cost than in the case of the Annex B-US coalition. Hence, the two countries reduce their total 
abatement costs. However, this new low-cost opportunity to comply with the Kyoto targets induces 
both the EU and Japan to invest less in R&D. Environmental-friendly technologies and cheap 
abatement possibilities thereby confirm themselves as possible substitutes (as already shown in 
Buonanno, Carraro and Galeotti, 2002). Both the EU and Japan reduce their R&D expenditures with 
respect to the Kyoto/Marrakech case (see Figure 1 again). As a consequence of the lower abatement 
costs and the reduced expenditure in R&D, both countries increase their total welfare.  
 
Russia suffers a high welfare loss from China’s participation in a climate regime. The main reason is 
the lower price in the permit market induced by China’s supply of permits. In addition, the presence in 
the market of a second large permit supplier clearly lessens the bargaining power of FSU, which 
previously controlled the permit market. By giving up its monopoly position, Russia reduces its profits 
from selling permits.  
 
When cooperating on emission reduction, China obviously loses out in comparison with the alternative 
case in which China free-rides on the other countries’ emission reductions. However, at the same time, 
China would profit from a large emission trading market. The net result of these two effects is a small 
welfare loss. This small loss could easily be compensated for by the existence of ancillary benefits, 
both environmental and economic, which are not yet accounted for by our model. A particular 
characteristic of the new situation is the large expansion of China’s R&D investments. The reason is 
that China – like the FSU in the Annex B-US coalition – over invests in R&D to increase its sales in the 
emission trading market. By strongly investing in technological innovations, China can gain profits in 
the permit market. With respect to the Annex B-US case, China increases its R&D by more than 70%. 
 
What are the implications of China’s participation in the climate coalition for the environmental 
effectiveness of the protocol? Notwithstanding China’s participation, total emissions increase. The 
reason is that China has emission targets over time that coincide with its business-as-usual emission 
levels. In addition, emissions in the other cooperating countries slightly increase due to the lower 
incentives to undertake emission-reducing R&D.  
 
                                                       
22 In another paper, we test the robustness of equilibrium outcomes to changes in the scenarios defining 
abatement targets in the second commitment period and beyond. See Buchner and Carraro (2003c).  
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Figure 1: The perspective climate regime: Japan, CHN, EU and FSU. 
 
 
 
 
 
As a consequence of the increased emissions, welfare in the US becomes lower because of the higher 
environmental damages arising from the growth in emissions. As already stated, the main reason why 
emissions increase is the decline in total R&D. R&D is lower because the increase in R&D efforts by 
China cannot offset the fall in R&D experienced by all the other participating countries. The EU and 
Japan face lower incentives to carry out R&D due to the large supply of emission permits. In addition, 
Russia reacts to the entrance of a new large permit supplier by strongly lowering its R&D investments 
since its incentive to undertake strategic R&D is lower. 
 
In short, the participation of China in the climate coalition will have two negative effects on the US 
economy. First, the US experience higher damage from climate change because of  total higher GHG 
emissions. Second, the US miss the opportunity to abate their own emissions at the much lower 
marginal cost (permit price) that the participation of China yields. Are these two effects sufficient to 
induce the US to change its mind and ratify the Kyoto Protocol? 
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3.2  A single coalition with the EU, Russia, Japan, the US and China 
 
In the previous section, the participation of China in the climate coalition was shown to provide 
benefits to the EU and Japan, but damages to the US economy. Would then the US benefit from 
joining the climate coalition? In order to address this question using the FEEM-RICE modelling 
framework, we must analyse the economic implications of a coalition consisting of Europe, Japan, 
FSU, the US and China, with only one free-rider (the Rest of the World). Figure 2 and Table 1 show 
our results.  Figure 2 illustrates changes with respect to the business-as-usual scenario. Table 1 shows 
the changes with respect to business-as-usual, considering both the present scenario and the one 
discussed in the section 3.1. 
 
First, notice that China would be the big winner in the case of US participation. China would profit 
from a very large permit market, where it could supply an even larger amount of permits than in the 
scenario examined in section 3.1. Therefore, China’s permit supply would be enhanced by strategic 
over-investments in R&D. With respect to the already large amount of R&D investments in the 
previous scenario, the enlarged coalition would induce almost a doubling of China’s R&D 
expenditure. China would be the main permit seller in the emission market, thus benefiting more than 
other countries from US participation. 
 
The FSU would like to profit from the larger emission market as well. It thus increases its strategic 
R&D investments in order to have more permits at its disposal, after having strongly reduced  its 
expenditure in R&D in the previous scenario (compared to the Marrakech situation, Russia still 
decreases its R&D by more than 40%, but R&D increases compared to the case in which China but 
not the US cooperates). Therefore, the FSU increases its supply of emission permits with respect to the 
previous scenario.  
 
The demand for permits also increases because of US participation in the trading market. The net 
effect estimated by our model is an increase in the permit price. Notice, however, that the permit price 
is still 63.08% lower than in the Annex B-US scenario in which it is assumed that only the EU, Japan 
and Russia  trade permits. 
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Figure 2: A wider single coalition climate regime: US, Japan, CHN, EU and FSU. 
 
 
 
 
Notwithstanding a permit price higher than in the Annex B-US+China climate coalition – which implies 
higher profits from selling “hot air” – the FSU is still the main loser in this scenario. However, its 
welfare loss with respect to the Kyoto/Marrakech coalition is lower than in the previous scenario, 
because of the increased demand for permits induced by US participation. 
 
Given the higher permit price, the EU and Japan face higher abatement costs and therefore suffer a 
decrease in their welfare with respect to the scenario in which the Kyoto/Marrakech coalition is 
enlarged by China only. However, if we compare their performance in the scenario in which both 
China and the US adopt the Kyoto Protocol with their performance in the Annex B-US scenario, we 
find that the larger permit market and the consequently relatively lower permit price still leads to an 
increase in welfare for both Europe and Japan (see Figure 2). 
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Table 1: Changes in welfare, emissions and R&D in the two scenarios with respect to 
  the BAU scenario 
 
  Coalitions 
  (JPN, EU, CHN, FSU)  (USA, JPN, EU, CHN, FSU) 
Welfare USA  -6.23% -9.46% 
Welfare JPN  10.84% 4.97% 
Welfare EU  10.60% 4.69% 
Welfare CHN  -5.67% 13.86% 
Welfare FSU  -21.54% -19.71% 
    
Emissions  3.26% -17.90% 
    
R&D USA  2.15% 4.13% 
R&D JPN  -2.05% -1.78% 
R&D EU  -6.13% -4.89% 
R&D CHN  71.83% 140.20% 
R&D FSU  -66.40% -43.16% 
 
 
 
 
Let us now consider the US. The two negative effects previously emphasised have been offset. On the 
one hand, the US participates in a permit market where the equilibrium price is quite low (63.08% 
lower than in the Kyoto/Marrakech scenario even though larger than in the absence of the US 
participation). On the other hand, total emissions are much lower and therefore the US suffers less 
damage from climate change. 
 
However, total welfare in the US does not increase (see Table 1). Even though the loss is small, it is 
clear that the adoption of the Kyoto targets entails a cost for the US. The net loss is small because 
China supplies permits at a low price and because total emissions decrease. However, this is not 
sufficient to increase total US welfare with respect to the case in which they free-ride. 
 
Therefore, the decision by China to comply with the Kyoto Protocol indeed creates a new environment 
in which it would be easier for the US to re-join the Kyoto climate coalition. However, the new 
incentives provided by China’s participation in the permit market are not sufficient to yield a positive  
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change  in  US welfare when they commit to their Kyoto target. Nonetheless, with the loss being quite 
small, political incentives reasons  may induce the US to move back to the Kyoto negotiations in order 
to reap the benefits of low short-term abatement costs and to negotiate less demanding abatement 
targets in the second commitment period
23.  
 
The big winner in this scenario would be the environment. As said, total emissions decrease by more 
than 20% with respect to the climate regime analysed in section 3.1. This result was expected, given 
that all big GHG emitters cooperate to achieve climate change control. This climate regime is thus the 
most environmental effective among those examined within this study. 
 
 
3.3 A fragmented climate regime consisting of the US with China and the EU with Russia and 
Japan  
 
There is a third scenario that could result from the incentives currently prevailing in climate policy. 
There is some evidence that a two-bloc climate regime, consisting of the Kyoto countries (EU, Japan 
and Russia) plus a bilateral cooperation between China and the US may not be unrealistic. Ever since 
the US and China normalised their diplomatic relations in the late 70s, cooperation on environment, 
science and technology matters has been a mainstay of U.S.-China relations
24. In February 2002, 
Presidents George W. Bush and Jiang Zemin agreed to establish a U.S.-China Working Group on 
Climate Change which now promotes and monitors bilateral research cooperation on climate change 
focusing on various key areas of policy and science.  
 
Furthermore, China’s recent decision to ratify the Kyoto Protocol demonstrates that the country is 
getting serious about international cooperation to address climate change. China is also aware that 
benefits from ratification could be high because of its role as the largest permit seller. Chinese officials 
emphasise that the government will voluntarily try to restrict the growth of CO2 emissions, but it is 
strictly opposing any binding GHG reduction targets (The Japan Times, Jan. 26
th, 2002).
25 
                                                       
23 Other scenarios, possibly even more attractive for the US, are discussed in Buchner and Carraro (2003b). 
24 In particular, the Agreement Between the Government of the U.S.A. and the Government of China on 
Cooperation in Science and Technology was one of the first between the two countries, signed during Deng 
Xiaoping’s historic visit to the United States in January 1979. There are now more than 30 protocols under this 
umbrella agreement covering everything from earthquake science to fisheries, agriculture, forestry, energy, 
nuclear safety, meteorology, space technology, high energy physics, the environment, nature conservation, water 
resources management, biology, medicine, transportation and telecommunications.   
For more information see http://www.usembassy-china.org.cn/sandt/BilateralActivities.html 
25 However, in the longer term, China will have to cope with its role of second-largest CO2 emitter in the world. 
The first signs that China is recognising these political reasons are clear. The ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in  
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Without binding commitments and given the high amount of “hot air” which can be expected from this 
region, China is a very attractive partner in climate change control activities, as already evidenced by 
the ongoing bilateral agreements between China and several other countries
26. This is why the US may 
be able to convince China to cooperate under a joint climate pact. In this way, the US could achieve 
two goals: (i) to satisfy domestic political requirements by involving developing countries in their 
climate strategy; (ii) to reap high benefits from a large bilateral emissions market (the US and China 
together account for more than one-third of  world-wide CO2 emissions, a share which is becoming 
larger and larger). In particular, the US could drastically decrease its abatement costs through emission 
trading and China could profit from selling a large amount of permits.  
 
 
Figure 3: A third climate regime with two blocs: 1) US and CHN; 2) EU, FSU and Japan 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
its actual form could therefore be interpreted more as a long-term commitment to emission control than as a 
short run strategy to reap the benefits on the emission trading market. 
26 Apart from the collaboration with the US, a bilateral cooperation on climate change has also been initiated 
with Australia in September 2003: see the official declaration at 
http://www.deh.gov.au/minister/env/2003/mr24oct203.html. 
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What would then be the main consequences of a two bloc climate regime with a first bloc formed by 
the EU, Japan and the FSU and a second bloc formed by the US and China? Some of these 
consequences are shown in Figure 3. 
 
First of all, it is clear that both the US and CHN lose in comparison with the case in which they free-
ride. However, the loss for the US is small and could be largely compensated for by some ancillary 
benefits from GHG emission abatement that are not taken into account in our model. In addition, due 
to the overall lower emission levels than in previous climate regimes, the welfare loss is the smallest 
among those attained by the US when it participates in a climate coalition.  
 
Even the loss for China is small – and even smaller when compared to the regime in which the 
coalition (Annex B-US + China) forms – and ancillary benefits, both environmental and economic , 
could be considerable. In a recent companion paper (Buchner and Carraro, 2003b), we show that the 
two-bloc climate regime is what would be most preferred by both the US and China when they do not 
free-ride. Namely, it is the most preferred among those in which they undertake some cooperative 
emission abatement. 
 
The inclusion of China in a coalition with the US is slightly beneficial for the Kyoto/Marrakech 
climate bloc consisting of the European Union, Japan and the FSU, because of the enhanced 
environmental effectiveness of this two bloc regime. Indeed, GHG emissions are almost 20% lower 
than in the benchmark case, and also lower with respect to total emissions in the climate regime in 
which the coalition (Annex B-US + China) forms. However, the coalition (Annex B-US + China) is the 
one most preferred by the EU and Japan because the absence of China from the Annex B-US coalition 
increases marginal abatement costs and thus induces welfare losses for the EU and Japan. 
 
This two-bloc climate regime is characterised again by a large expansion of China’s R&D 
investments. China over invests in R&D to increase its sales in the bilateral emission trading market. 
The segmentation of the trading market also explains why R&D investments within the Annex B-US 
coalition do not change. However, if the comparison is made with the coalition (Annex B-US + China), 
then it can be seen that R&D investments become higher for all Annex B-US countries. The reason is 
again the larger marginal abatement costs when China is not a seller in the permit market. This induces 
higher investments in R&D in the EU and Japan and also strategic R&D investments in the FSU, 
which  finds it optimal to increase its supply of permits. 
 
In addition to economic and environmental benefits, there would be political benefits as well (Cf. 
Stewart and Wiener, 2003). The involvement of the US in international climate change control would   
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provide evidence that the developed world is getting more serious about action against global 
warming. In particular, with respect to a long-term strategy, it would be difficult to call for an 
involvement of developing countries if the US are not engaged in climate control. This argument has 
been emphasised by Brazil’s president who asks the US president to “show greater commitment to the 
global fight to protect the environment” (Planet Ark, Jan. 28
th, 2002). Similarly, Stewart and Wiener 
(2003) point out that the coalition between the US and China could actually improve the global 
climate regime and lead to a comprehensive approach to climate control  that includes all major 
emitting countries. 
 
 
4.  Conclusions 
 
This paper has analysed the evolution of climate change policy after the Marrakech negotiations, 
focusing on the one hand on the political and economic forces which have led to the emergence of the 
present climate regime and on the other hand on the implications of this situation for the future of 
climate negotiations. 
 
Our analysis has drawn attention on the role of China and of the new incentives that China’s adoption 
of the Kyoto Protocol and its participation in the international permit market could provide. What 
emerges from this analysis is a situation in which the decision of China to participate in the climate 
coalition is beneficial for both the EU and Japan, because it lowers abatement costs. However, China’s 
participation penalises Russia, because it lowers Russia’s profits from selling permits.  
 
We have shown that the US is also damaged by China’s participation in the coalition with the EU, 
Japan and Russia. The reason is the increase in GHG emissions induced by the lower incentives to 
adopt climate friendly technologies. In addition, the US misses the opportunity to abate emissions at 
the low abatement cost that China’s participation induces. Therefore, one may wonder whether the US 
would be better off by cooperating with China – as well as with the EU, Japan and FSU – on GHG 
emission control. The answer is negative. Although cooperation provides some benefits, total welfare 
does not increase and the US are still better off by free-riding on the other countries (small) emission 
reductions. 
 
However, cooperation between the US and the other countries could take a different form. For 
example, the US could propose a bilateral deal to China that may be induced to cooperate with the US 
rather than with the Annex B-US countries. In this scenario, the US and China form their own  bilateral 
permit market, whereas the EU, Japan and Russia trade in a second different market. We have shown  
  21
that, in this scenario, the environmental effectiveness of the climate regime is greatly increased and 
welfare losses are small in all countries. 
 
Our conclusions can be summarised as follows. The participation of the US in a climate regime is not 
likely, at least in the short run. The US is more likely to adopt unilateral policies than to join the 
present Kyoto group (even when it includes China). However, a two-bloc regime would become the 
most preferred option if both China and the US, for political or environmental reasons, decide to 
cooperate on GHG emission control. If the US decide to cooperate, the climate regime that provides 
the highest incentives to the cooperating countries is the one in which China and the US cooperate 
bilaterally, with the Annex B-US countries remaining within the Kyoto framework. 
 
Is it sufficient to suggest that climate change negotiations could take a new direction by abandoning 
the Kyoto architecture to adopt a new multi-bloc approach similar to the one prevailing in 
international trade negotiations? Probably not. The above conclusions need cautious consideration. In 
particular, our empirical analysis focuses on economic incentives, whereas recent climate negotiations 
have shown that political decisions are often taken on the basis of other types of incentives. In 
addition, the model used in our analysis is a simplified representation of the world economic system, 
even though it captures the main economic mechanisms and the related incentive schemes. However, 
our analysis clearly suggests that moving out of the Kyoto framework could provide important 
economic and environmental benefits and therefore calls for additional research on this issue. 
 
A further development of our analysis could be the comparison of different multi-bloc climate 
regimes. Blocs could be identified at  regional level (e.g. EU, NAFTA, ASEAN) or could be defined 
by political or environmental interests (e.g. G77, AOSIS). Including more climate coalitions in the 
analysis could of course change the ranking of the regimes. Some preliminary results are in Buchner,  
and Carraro (2003b), where the economic consequences of the formation of a wide range of partial 
and/or regional climate coalitions are analysed.  
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Appendix. The FEEM-RICE Model 
 
 
The FEEM-RICE model is an extension of Nordhaus and Yang’s (1996) regional RICE model of 
integrated assessment, which is one of the most popular and manageable integrated assessment tools 
for the study of climate change (see, for instance, Eyckmans and Tulkens, 2001). It is basically a 
single sector optimal growth model which has been extended to incorporate the interaction between 
economic activities and climate. One such model has been developed for each macro region into 
which the world is divided (USA, Japan, Europe, China, Former Soviet Union, and Rest of the World). 
 
Within each region a central planner chooses the optimal paths of fixed investment and emission 
abatement that maximise the present value of per capita consumption. Output (net of climate change) 
is used for investment and consumption and is produced according to  constant returns Cobb-Douglas 
technology, which combines the inputs from capital and labour with the level of technology. 
Population (taken to be equal to full employment) and technology levels grow over time in an 
exogenous fashion, whereas capital accumulation is governed by the optimal rate of investment. There 
is a wedge between output gross and net of climate change effects, the size of which is dependent 
upon the amount of abatement (rate of emission reduction) as well as the change in global 
temperature. The model is completed by three equations representing emissions (which are related to 
output and abatement), carbon cycle (which relates concentrations to emissions), and climate module 
(which relates the change in temperature relative to 1990 levels to carbon concentrations) respectively. 
 
In our extension of the model, technical change is no longer exogenous. Instead, the issue of 
endogenous technical change is tackled by following the ideas contained in both Nordhaus (1999) and 
Goulder and Mathai (2000) and accordingly modifying Nordhaus and Yang’s (1996) RICE model. 
Doing so requires the input of a number of additional parameters, some of which have been estimated 
using information provided by Coe and Helpman (1995), while the remaining parameters were 
calibrated so as to reproduce the business-as-usual scenario generated by the RICE model with 
exogenous technical change. 
 
In particular, the following factors are included: first, endogenous technical change affecting factor 
productivity is introduced. This is done by adding the stock of knowledge in each production function 
and by relating the stock of knowledge to R&D investments. Second, induced technical change is 
introduced, by allowing the stock of knowledge to affect  the emission-output ratio as well. Finally, 
international technological spillovers are also accounted for in the model. 
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Within each version of the model, countries play a non-cooperative Nash game in a dynamic setting, 
which yields an Open Loop Nash equilibrium (see Eyckmans and Tulkens, 2001, for an explicit 
derivation of first order conditions of the optimum problem). This is a situation in which, in each 
region, the planner maximises social welfare subject to the individual resource and capital constraints 
and the climate module, given the emission and investment strategies (in the base case) and the R&D 
expenditure strategy (in the endogenous technological change case) of all other players. 
 
The Standard Model without Induced Technical Change 
 
As  previously mentioned, it is assumed for the purpose of this model that innovation is brought about 
by R&D spending which contributes to the accumulation of the stock of existing knowledge. 
Following an approach pioneered by Griliches (1979, 1984), it is assumed that the stock of knowledge 
is a factor of production, which therefore enhances the rate of productivity (see also the discussion in 
Weyant, 1997; Weyant and Olavson, 1999). In this formulation, R&D efforts prompt non-
environmental technical progress, but with different modes and elasticities. More precisely, the RICE 
production function output is modified as follows: 
 
  ] ) , ( ) , ( [ ) , ( ) , ( ) , (
1 γ γ β − = t n K t n L t n K t n A t n Q F R
n             (1) 
 
where Q is output (gross of climate change effects), A the exogenously given level of technology and 
KR, L, and KF are respectively the inputs from knowledge capital, labour, and physical capital. 
In (1), the stock of knowledge has a region-specific output elasticity equal to βn (n=1,…6). It should 
be noted that, as long as this coefficient is positive, the output production process is characterised by 
increasing returns to scale, in line with current theories of endogenous growth. This implicitly assumes 
the existence of cross-sectoral technological spillovers within each country (Romer, 1990). In 
addition, it should be noted that while allowing for R&D-driven technological progress, we maintain 
the possibility that technical improvements can also be determined exogenously (the path of A is the 
same as that specified in the original RICE model). The stock accumulates in the usual fashion: 
 
 
  ) , ( ) 1 ( ) , ( & ) 1 , ( t n K t n D R t n K R R R δ − + = +               ( 2 )  
 
where  R&D is the expenditure in Research and Development and δR is the rate of knowledge 
depreciation. Finally, it is recognised that some resources are absorbed by R&D spending. That is: 
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where Y is net output (net of climate change effects as specified in the RICE model), C is consumption 
and I gross fixed capital formation. 
At this stage the model maintains the same emissions function as Nordhaus’ RICE model which will 
be modified in the next section: 
 
  ) , ( )] , ( 1 )[ , ( ) , ( t n Q t n t n t n E µ σ − =                ( 4 )  
 
where σ can be loosely defined as the emissions-output ratio, E stands for emissions and µ for the rate 
of abatement effort. The policy variables included in the model are rates of fixed investment and of 
emission abatement. For the other variables, the model specifies a time path of exogenously given 
values. Interestingly, this is also the case for technology level A and of the emissions-output ratio σ. 
Thus, the model presented so far assumes no induced technical change, i.e. an exogenous 
environmental technical change, and a formulation of productivity that evolves both exogenously and 
endogenously. In the model, investment fosters economic growth (thereby driving up emissions) while 
abatement is the only policy variable used for reducing emissions. 
 
Induced Technical Change 
 
In the second step of our model formulation, endogenous environmental technical change is accounted 
for. It is assumed that the stock of knowledge – which in the previous formulation was only a factor of 
production - also serves the purpose of reducing, ceteris paribus, the level of carbon emissions. Thus, 
in the second formulation, R&D efforts prompt both environmental and non-environmental technical 
progress, although with different modes and elasticities.
27 More precisely, the RICE emission-output 
relationship is modified as follows: 
 
  ) , ( )] , ( 1 ))][ , ( exp( [ ) , ( t n Q t n t n K t n E R n n n µ α χ σ − − + =          (4’) 
 
In (4’), knowledge reduces the emissions-output ratio with an elasticity of αn, which is also region-
specific; the parameter χn is a scaling coefficient, whereas σn is the value to which the emission-output 
ratio tends asymptotically as the stock of knowledge increases without limit. In this formulation, R&D 
                                                       
27 Obviously, we could have introduced two different types of R&D efforts, respectively contributing to the 
growth of an environmental knowledge stock and a production knowledge stock. Such undertaking however is 
made difficult by the need  to specify variables and calibrate  parameters for which there is no immediately 
available and sound information in the literature.  
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contributes to output productivity on the one hand, and affects the emission-output ratio - and 
therefore the overall level of pollution emissions - on the other . 
 
Knowledge Spillovers 
 
Previous formulations do not include the effect of potential spillovers produced by knowledge, and 
therefore ignore the fact that both technologies and organisational structures disseminate   
internationally. Modern economies are linked by vast and continually expanding flows of trade, 
investment, people and ideas. The technologies and choices of one region are and will inevitably be 
affected by developments in other regions. 
 
Following the work of Weyant and Olavson (1999), who suggest that the definition of spillovers in  an 
induced technical change context be kept plain and simple (in the light of a currently incomplete 
understanding of the problem) , disembodied, or knowledge spillovers are modelled (see Romer, 
1990). They refer to the R&D carried out and paid for by one party that produces benefits to other 
parties which then have better or more inputs than before or can somehow benefit from R&D carried 
out elsewhere. Therefore, in order to capture international spillovers of knowledge, the stock of world 
knowledge is introduced in the third version of the FEEM-RICE model, both in the production 
function and in the emission-output ratio equation. Equations (1) and (4’) are then revised as follows: 
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where the stock of world knowledge: 
 
  ∑
≠
=
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is defined in such a way as not to include a country’s own stock. 
 
Emission Trading 
 
As mentioned above, throughout the analysis we assume the adoption of efficient policies. As a 
consequence, the model also includes the possibility of flexibility mechanisms. In particular we  
  29
compare the two cases in which emission trading takes place amongst all original Annex I countries 
(including the US),  first  with one in which trading is allowed amongst Annex 1 countries without the 
US, and then  one in which emission trading takes place amongst all Annex I countries without the US 
and Russia. 
When running the model in the presence of emission trading, two additional equations are considered: 
 
  ) , ( ) ( ) , ( & ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( t n NIP t p t n D R t n I t n C t n Y + + + =          (3’) 
 
which replaces equation (3) and: 
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where NIP(n,t) is the net demand for permits and Kyoto(n) are the emission targets set in the Kyoto 
Protocol for the signatory countries and the BAU levels for the non-signatory ones. According to (3’), 
resources produced by the economy must be devoted, in addition to consumption, investment, and 
research and development, to net purchases of emission permits. Equation (6) states that a region’s 
emissions may exceed the limit set in Kyoto if permits are bought, and vice versa in the case of sales 
of permits. Note that p(t) is the price of a unit of tradable emission permits expressed in terms of the 
numeraire output price. Moreover, there is an additional policy variable to be considered in this case, 
which is net demand for permits NIP. 
 
 In terms of the possibility of emission trading, the sequence whereby a Nash equilibrium is reached 
can be described as follows. Each region maximises its utility subject to  its individual resource and 
capital constraints, now including the Kyoto constraint, and the climate module for a given emission 
(i.e. abatement) strategy of all the other players and a given price of permits p(0) (in the first round 
this is set at an arbitrary level). When all regions have made their optimal choices, the overall net 
demand for permits is computed at the given price. If the sum of net demands in each period is 
approximately zero, a Nash equilibrium is obtained; otherwise the price is revised as a function of the 
market disequilibrium and each region’s decision process starts again. 
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